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ABSTRACT
Dynamic rational expectations models imply that the real value of debt in the hands of the public must
be equal to the expected present-value of surpluses. We impose this equilibrium condition on an identified
VAR and characterize the way in which the present-value support of debt varies across various types
of fiscal policy shocks and between fiscal and non-fiscal shocks. The role of expected primary surpluses
in supporting innovations to debt depends on the nature of the shock. For some fiscal policy shocks,
debt is supported almost entirely by changes in the present-value of surpluses, however, in the case
of other fiscal policy shocks, surpluses fail to adjust and instead leave a large role for expected changes
in discount rates. Horizons over which debt innovations are financed are long – on the order of fifty
years – while present-values calculated up to any finite horizon up to then fluctuate wildly, particularly
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1. Introduction
The global recession and ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009 have spurred interest in ﬁscal
policy, particularly in estimates of multipliers associated with various ﬁscal instru-
ments. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to align the thought experiments underlying
existing time series evidence on multipliers with the experiments conducted in fully
speciﬁed general equilibrium models. Theoretical models require that ﬁscal distur-
bances that alter the value of outstanding government debt be expected to bring
forth adjustments in future net-of-interest surpluses and seigniorage; moreover, the-
ory predicts that the precise source of future ﬁscal adjustments—taxes, spending,
or inﬂation—matter for the resulting impacts of the ﬁscal shocks. Identiﬁed vector
autoregressions, the preeminent tool in empirical ﬁscal research, do not impose the in-
tertemporal restriction linking current debt to expected future policies and, therefore,
are diﬃcult to interpret in light of dynamic theory.
The government’s present-value budget constraint is an attractive target for ratio-
nalizing macroeconomic responses to ﬁscal policy because the net taxes component of
the present-value relation directly impacts forward-looking households through their
own present-value constraints. Accordingly, if we wish to understand why households
with rational expectations respond in certain ways to ﬁscal policy shocks, it is valu-
able to understand how these households perceive their present-value tax burden as
evolving. Moreover, if we wish to understand why forward-looking households are
content to hold government debt at prevailing market prices, it is essential to know
how violations of the household transversality conditions are avoided, and this means
understanding how the government present value relation is satisﬁed.
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Rational expectations implies that economic agents’ beliefs about how future ﬁscal
policy will adjust to innovations in government debt play a crucial role in deter-
mining the resulting equilibrium. Prominent examples where theoretical conclusions
about macro policy hinge on such beliefs include Ricardian equivalence, “Unpleasant
Monetarist Arithmetic,” and the ﬁscal theory of the price level.
1 In striking con-
trast, empirical studies are either mute, as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and the
identiﬁed VAR work that followed, or build in the assumption that net surpluses or
total tax revenues clear the government budget constraint [Bohn (1998), Davig and
Leeper (2006), or Favero and Monacelli (2005)]. This paper oﬀers some new empirical
ﬁndings that connect more tightly to theoretical work.
Our desire to examine the historical sources of ﬁscal ﬁnancing leads us to include
government debt in an otherwise conventional ﬁscal VAR, like those estimated by
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004), Canova and Pappas (2007), Mountford
and Uhlig (2009), and Caldara and Kamps (2008). By including debt, we conﬁrm
the results of Favero and Giavazzi (2007), to the eﬀect that estimates of ﬁscal policy
impacts appear to be sensitive to the choice of information set included in the VAR.
Ultimately, however, our baseline model delivers qualitative results similar to those
in the literature.
The principal contribution of this paper stems from imposing the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint on an estimated VAR to answer the question posed
by the paper’s title. With a consistent accounting framework in hand, we examine how
innovations in debt produced by exogenous shocks to government spending, transfers,
and taxes have been expected to be ﬁnanced intertemporally. We ﬁnd robust evidence
in favor of a stabilizing role for the primary surplus following shocks to taxes and
transfers. Regarding the role of real interest rates, the evidence is less clear, although
there is support for a destabilizing role for the real rate following transfer shocks.
Our work is closely related to Giannitsarou and Scott (2006) and Bohn (1991).
The paper by Giannitsarou and Scott, however, is concerned with testing present-
value balance, an eﬀort initiated by Hamilton and Flavin (1986). Instead, we impose
the linearized intertemporal government budget constraint on an identiﬁed VAR and
study its implications for ﬁscal ﬁnancing. We focus on describing how present-value
balance is achieved, contingent on the realization of certain identiﬁed ﬁscal policy
shocks.
This focus on the intertemporal funding mechanism is shared with the paper by
Bohn Bohn (1991). Our work diﬀers from Bohn on two dimensions. First, we impose
certain strong restrictions deriving from the linearized ﬂow budget constraint. In
1A very partial list of analyses in which intertemporal ﬁnancing of government debt is pivotal
includes Barro (1974), Sargent and Wallace (1981), Leeper (1991), Baxter and King (1993), Sims
(1998), Woodford (2001), and Leeper and Yang (2008).WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 3
both papers, the ﬂow budget constraint has the form bt = rbt−1 − st + δt, where bt is
the real value of debt outstanding at time t, st is the real primary surplus, including
seignorage, and r is a discount factor. In Bohn (1991), δ is an unrestricted process,
accounting formally for variations in the real interest rate and for approximation error
in the form of the budget constraint. In this paper, we take an explicit stand on the
form of δ, which is decomposed into a term depending linearly on the real interest
rate and an expectation error. The appearance of an expectation error, in turn,
arises from a ﬁrst-order approximation to the ﬂow constraint in the presence of multi-
period debt. By constraining this component to be an expectation error, we take the
stand that linearization error is negligible (in present-value, at least) and thus shift
the burden of intertemporal adjustment to economically interpretable mechanisms.2
This assumption gives rise to a number of additional constraints beyond the usual co-
integration relation, imposed by Bohn. Secondarily, the estimation framework used
in Bohn (1991) assumes that present-value balance is the only co-integrating relation
among variables in the VAR. This assumption, while reasonable in the context of
Bohn’s smaller VAR, is less attractive in the much larger VAR that we estimate.
Therefore, in addition to our baseline model, which does not impose any unit root
restrictions, we present a straightforward estimator which allows for multidimensional
co-integration, in addition to the present-value restrictions.
This paper is also closely related to Roberds (1991). Roberds includes a measure of
government debt in his empirical work to test whether the government’s present-value
condition holds in expectation. Although we impose the condition, both Roberds and
we avoid the impossibility result of Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent (1991) by including
debt in the information set and applying the present-value condition in expectation.
Consistent with previous ﬁndings, we ﬁnd robust evidence in favor of a stabilizing
role for the primary surplus following tax shocks and similarly robust evidence of
a stabilizing role for taxes following a spending shock. Conversely, our estimates
speak strongly against a stabilizing role for spending adjustments in the face of either
tax or spending shocks. Our results regarding the role of the real interest rate are
rather sensitively dependent on assumptions concerning the long-run behavior of the
system. In particular, in the baseline VAR, interest rates are stabilizing following
spending shocks, whereas the imposition of unit-root restrictions appears to reverse
this conclusion. Finally, regardless of the long-run assumptions, detecting present-
value balance requires very extended forecast horizons, on the order of a century, as
ﬁscal shocks generate highly persistent, but ultimately transient, dynamical responses
in the primary surplus.
2To the extent that ﬁrst-order approximation fails, it is likely that the VAR framework used here
and in previous papers in the literature would itself have to be substantially re-considered.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 4
2. An Illustrative Model
This section uses a conventional dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model—a standard real business cycle model—to derive a typical model’s implications
for ﬁscal ﬁnancing dynamics and to illustrate the computations we perform in the
identiﬁed VARs below. Although bare-bones, the model is adequate to our focus on
the long-run aspects of ﬁscal ﬁnance. More sophisticated versions of this model which
are being ﬁt to data largely consist of modiﬁcations of the bare-bones model that are
designed to capture short-run dynamics in data. Their long-run implications closely
match those of the simpler model we examine [see, for example, Leeper, Plante, and
Traum (2009)].
The model shows that in general the impacts of ﬁscal disturbances depend on how
the government budget constraint is expected to be satisﬁed in the long run, a point
that dates back at least to Christ (1968) and has found recent voice in Baxter and
King (1993), Sims (1998), and Leeper and Yang (2008). With a simple model in
hand, we derive the sources of intertemporal ﬁnancing of government debt and the
horizons at which that funding occurs.






tu(Ct,1 − Nt), 0 < β < 1 (1)
with u(C,1 − N) = C1−γ/(1 − γ) + θ(1 − N)1−γN/(1 − γN), subject to
Ct + Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 + Bt = (1 − τt)Yt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 + Zt, (2)
where Zt is lump-sum transfers (or taxes when Zt < 0). Goods are produced using a





{At} is the serially correlated technology process.
The aggregate resource constraint is
Ct + Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 + Gt = Yt. (4)
Gt is government purchases of goods at t, and the government budget constraint is
Bt + τtYt = Gt + Zt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1, (5)
where Bt is the amount of one-period debt outstanding at t, which pays (1+rt)Bt at
t + 1. We let Tt ≡ τtYt denote total tax revenues.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 5
Following existing work on ﬁscal policy, we posit that policy obeys simple rules
that make ﬁscal variables respond contemporaneously to output and with a lag to
the state of government debt (written in log deviations from steady state):
ˆ gt = ϕGˆ yt − γGˆ bt−1 + u
G
t , (6)




ˆ zt = ϕZˆ yt − γZˆ bt−1 + u
Z
t . (8)
The u’s follow AR(1) processes. The output elasticities, the ϕ’s, are borrowed from
the empirical studies of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004), and Leeper and
Yang (2004). We use the baseline parameter values described in table 1.
2.2. Some Accounting. Let the equilibrium dynamics be characterized by factors
ft, evolving according to ft = ft−1A + ut, in terms of which the model variables are





















where unsubscripted variables denote deterministic steady state values. This equa-
tion gives a decomposition of innovations to real debt into innovations to surplus
components, at constant discount rates, and into innovations in the real interest rate.
Using the equilibrium law of motion, the inﬁnite sum can be expressed as
















Denote innovations in xt by δxt ≡ xt − Et−1xt. Then
















It is also possible to compute the horizon over which an innovation to the ex-
pected present value of surpluses converges to the innovation in debt. Speciﬁcally,
suppose that the previous inﬁnite series is truncated at a horizon K. Again using the





















Expression (12) answers the question, “What fraction of a $1 innovation in debt at
time t is ﬁnanced by period t+K.” Of course, as K → ∞, expression (12) approaches
expression (11).WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 6
2.3. Dynamic Impacts of Fiscal Shocks. Many DSGE models follow the public
ﬁnance literature in studying the impacts of ﬁscal disturbances by assuming the gov-
ernment budget clears in some “neutral” manner, for example, through adjustments
in lump-sum taxes or transfers. That assumption implies setting γZ > 1/β − 1 and
γG = γτ = 0 in policy rules (6)-(8). Solid line in ﬁgure 1 report the well-known
implications of a standard RBC model. Persistently higher government spending re-
duces wealth, which reduces consumption and induces greater work eﬀort, initially
raising output. Higher taxes reduce output, consumption, and investment. Ricardian
equivalence implies that lump-sum taxes do nothing.
Table 2 reports how an increase in debt brought forth by each of the three ﬁscal
shocks is expected to be ﬁnanced when transfers adjust. Not surprisingly, serially
correlated spending and tax shocks create expectations of present values of spending
and taxes that move in opposite directions from the initial change in debt. Transfers
move with debt, as the ﬁscal rule would suggest. Discount rate changes account for a
trivial fraction of the ﬁnancing of debt, a result that is ubiquitous in the plain-vanilla
RBC model. The discount rate also moves against the change in debt.
When government spending adjusts to clear the budget—γG = 1,γτ = γZ = 0—
important diﬀerences emerge in the impulse response functions, as dotted lines in
ﬁgure 1 show. An expectation that higher spending will reduce future spending
eliminates the expansionary eﬀects of higher spending and ameliorates the negative
wealth eﬀects on consumption, while it raises the capital stock in the future. When
higher current taxes portend higher future government spending, consumption falls
more markedly. Higher transfers now create the expectation of lower future spending,
which reduces work eﬀort and output, but raises consumption.
Finally, suppose that taxes adjust to ensure ﬁscal sustainability—γτ = 1,γG =
γZ = 0. Positive spending or transfer shocks, which are expected to generate higher
taxes in the future, now sharply reduce output, consumption, and capital [dashed lines
in ﬁgure 1]. Tax hikes, on the other hand, after initially reducing these variables, raise
them with a lag.3
The simple policy rules produce monotonic adjustments in funding over horizons
after which the serial correlation of the shocks has decayed. Figure 2 illustrates this
phenomenon in the case when only taxes adjust to debt. The smaller is the adjust-
ment parameter, the more prolonged is the adjustment process. At horizons beyond
about 10 periods, the innovation to the expected present value of surpluses converges
monotonically to the innovation in debt for each of the three ﬁscal disturbances.
3When either spending or taxes adjust to clear the budget, as in table 2, the present value of
discount rates accounts for a trivial share of the value of debt.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 7
3. A Consistent Accounting Framework
3.1. The Intertemporal Budget Constraint. Let government debt in the hands
of the public at time t consist of zero coupon bonds with nominal face value Bt(j)
maturing at t+j, for all j ≥ 1. Further, let the total nominal value of debt outstanding
be Vt ≡
P∞
j=1 Bt(j)Qt(j) and let the nominal primary surplus be St. The surplus is
deﬁned as St = Tt−Gt−Zt, where Tt is tax receipts, Gt is government spending, and
Zt is transfer payments. The government budget identity is then4
∞ X
j=1
(Bt(j) − Bt−1(j + 1))Qt(j) = Bt−1(1) − St. (13)



























Bt−1(j + 1) and Pt is the price level.












































Bt−1(j + 1). (16)
ωt reﬂects changes in both the maturity structure of government debt and the term
structure of interest rates.
4For expository clarity, we abstract from seigniorage in this section of the paper. The empirical
work, however, involves imposing the full budget constraint, including seigniorage, which for the ﬂow
budget constraint is deﬁned as (Mt − Mt−1)/Pt, where M is the monetary base. The addition of
seigniorage terms introduces no new conceptual issues. We also abstract from modeling population
growth, eﬀectively treating it as exogenous with respect to the shocks captured by the VAR.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 8
Thus, λtωt = ηt, where Etηt+1 = 0. To anticipate slightly, when discounted, the ωt
term in (14) will disappear in expectation, so it will not contribute to the present-
value expressions below. Innovations in ωt can nonetheless play an important role by
revaluing debt.
















where, as usual, the transversality condition implies the absence of a bubble term in
(17).
For the purposes of linearization, it is convenient to express (14) and (17) scaled by
output. For any nominal variable Xt, let the corresponding variable xt ≡ Xt
Yt , where
Y is nominal output, and deﬁne γt as
Yt/Pt
Yt−1/Pt−1, the growth rate of real output. Scaled





















where vt is the market value of debt as a share of output.
If it were feasible to estimate an empirical model that included government bonds
and bond prices at all maturities, we would work directly with the ﬂow constraint in
(13). Because such a model is not practicable, we introduce ωt to express the budget
constraint in terms of the value of debt, v, the one-period interest rate, Qt−1(1), the
surplus, and other variables, as in (18). In the estimated model, ωt is a residual,
which is a linear combination of the VAR errors, that clears the period-by-period
government budget constraint.
3.2. The VAR and Its Constraints. Now consider log-linearizations of (18) and
(19) around ﬁxed values for (v,γ,s,Pω/Y ) and the growth rate of λ. Denote ˆ xt ≡
log(xt) − log(x). Deﬁne the one-period nominal interest rate at date t − 1 as Rt−1 =WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 9
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where for steady state values of variables we use sample means. (Because ω can be





represents deviations of Ptωt
Yt
from its linearization point.) The linearized form of the present-value constraint is:









− ˆ Rt+s−1 + ˆ γt+s + ˆ πt+s + ˆ st+j
!
(21)




λt is the constant steady state growth rate of the marginal utility




s=1 Xt+s = 1
1−β
P∞
j=1 βjXt+j. Therefore, equation (21) can be
written as












Ultimately, we wish to express the real quantity variables in levels, rather than as
fractions of output. Deﬁne ˜ vt ≡ log(Vt/Pt), ˜ πt ≡ log(πt), and ˜ Rt ≡ log(Rt). Using
the steady-state relations and eliminating output growth, equation (22) implies that












where k = −
β
1−β (ln(1/β)/β + τln(τ)/v − gln(g)/v − zln(z)/v) + ln(v) and s˜ st =
τ˜ τt−g˜ gt−z˜ zt. Thus, ﬂuctuations in real debt must be balanced by expected changes in
the present-value expression on the right-hand side. Moreover, this present-value can
itself be thought of as consisting of two components: the present-value of surpluses
at constant steady-state discount rates and a term which measures changes in the
expected path of those discount rates. These two components can play very diﬀerent
roles in restoring present-value balance.
Suppose that the state of the model economy is characterized by the M-dimensional
factors ft which, in companion form, evolve according to the VAR process
ft = B0 + ft−1B + ut. (24)
Let a model variable xt be related to the underlying factors by a coeﬃcient matrix
Cx such that
˜ xt = ftCx (25)WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 10
The government budget constraint in equation (23) implies the following restrictions







































Expression (27) imposes restrictions on the deterministic growth components of the
VAR. Because our focus is on innovation accounting and the deterministic components
are irrelevant, we do not impose (27) on the estimated VAR.
In addition, if the matrix βB possesses explosive eigenvalues, we must impose
conditions which guarantee that the inﬁnite sum in (23) exists. Speciﬁcally, let V be
the matrix of right eigenvectors of βB and suppose that µj is an eigenvalue such that


















Note that the VAR does not contain the term ωt in equation (14). Variations in
this variable thus implicitly maintain the government’s ﬂow budget constraint period
by period. As is evident above, however, the present-value constraint implies that
the ﬂow constraint holds in expectation.
3.3. Estimation Procedure. We conduct estimation and inference in a least-squares
framework. As before, let the VAR be ft = B0 + ft−1B + ut, for t = 0,...,T. Then
the objective function is max
P
t u0
tΣut. Let f be a data matrix whose rows consist
of the variables ft, for each t > 0 and deﬁne f− as the corresponding lagged data ma-
trix. Deﬁne W− ≡ [1,f−] and b ≡ vec([B0
0,B0]0). The part of the objective function
relating to b can be re-written (b −ˆ b)0S(b −ˆ b), where ˆ b ≡ I ⊗ (W 0
−W−)−1(W 0
−f) and
S = (Σ⊗Z0Z). We maximize this objective function subject to a constraint C0b = C−
(deﬁned below). The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is S(b −ˆ b) = C0
0λ0. It fol-
lows that C0b = C− = C0ˆ b+C0S−1C0
0λ0, or that b = ˆ b+S−1C0
0(C0S−1C0
0)−1(C−−C0ˆ b).
From equation (26), we have that [0,I][B0
0,B0]0C0 = C−, so that the constraint is
(C0
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and
C− ≡ (Cv + CR) (30)
Estimates presented here are from a feasible GLS procedure, iterated until conver-
gence, in which Σ−1 is a consistent estimate of the residual covariance matrix.
The discount factor β plays an important role in computing present values. We
compute this from the steady state government budget constraint after imposing that
1/β = R/π and using the sample means for taxes, spending, transfers, and debt as a
share of GDP. The calculated value is β = .9967.
4. The VAR Specification
This section discusses the identiﬁcation of the VAR models and the data used in
the estimation.
4.1. Identifying Fiscal Policy Shocks. As is well known, the reduced-form resid-
uals do not necessarily have economically meaningful interpretations. In order to
identify the linear combinations of reduced-form residuals that reﬂect exogenous ﬁs-
cal policy disturbances, we follow the method of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), as
extended by Perotti (2004).
Suppose that the reduced form VAR is ft = B0 + ft−1B + ut and that one is
interested in recovering the structural form ftA0 = ¯ A + ft−1A + tJ, where J is a
block diagonal matrix with the ﬁrst block at the upper left corner a k-dimensional
matrix coupling the k ﬁscal policy shocks. Following Blanchard and Perotti, assume
that the reduced-form innovations to a ﬁscal policy instrument, for example, taxes,
ut(T), can be modeled as
ut(T) = ut(Y )AY,T + ut(π)Aπ,T + ut(R)AR,T + t(T) + t(G)JG,T + t(Z)JZ,T, (31)
where ut(Y ) is the residual associated with output, ut(π) the inﬂation residual, ut(R)
the interest rate residual and t(T), t(G), and t(Z) are the identiﬁed exogenous ﬁscal
shocks to taxes, government spending, and transfers. The coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst k
columns in A in (31) are identiﬁed from institutional information about automatic
responses in the policy instrument in question. It then is possible to obtain the
covariance matrix of the ﬁscal policy matrix J. In order to determine impact responses
to the individual shocks, it is necessary to make assumptions concerning the relations
among the ﬁscal shocks themselves. We assume that the ﬁscal shocks are recursively
ordered with taxes ﬁrst, followed by spending and transfers. We refer to the shocks
as “tax,” “spending,” and “transfer” shocks, but it is important to bear in mind
that each class of shock will entail substantial movements in the other ﬁscal policy
instruments via endogenous propagation mechanisms.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 12
We draw on unpublished results from Leeper and Yang (2004) to calibrate the
elasticities in (31). Previous work in this literature has typically entered taxes net of
transfers into the VAR. We prefer to disaggregate taxes and transfers, because, on
theoretical grounds, distortionary taxes may lead to behavioral responses not charac-
terized simply by their impact on the present-value of lifetime resources. We follow
the assumptions in Perotti (2004); speciﬁcally, the price elasticity of real transfers
is −1 and the output elasticity of transfers is −.15. The output elasticity of taxes
is therefore given by αTY = (1 − Z
T )αnetTY + αZY
Z
T , with a similar equation for the
inﬂation elasticity, where Z/T is the steady state ratio of transfers to taxes. These
elasticities appear in table 3.
4.2. The Data. The empirical model is a quarterly VAR using U.S. data on the
following variables in log levels: real GDP, the GDP deﬂator, gross private domestic
investment, the three-month Treasury bill rate, the 10-year Treasury bond yield, the
monetary base, and ﬁscal variables. Fiscal data, which are for the Federal govern-
ment only, include taxes, transfers, spending, and debt (all NIPA).6 The data cover
the period from 1947:2 to 2006:2. Federal spending is deﬁned as the sum of Federal
consumption expenditure, gross investment and consumption of ﬁxed capital. Federal
taxes include all current tax receipts and contributions for social insurance. Finally,
net transfers include net current transfers, capital transfers, income from assets and
subsidies. The three-month T-bill rate is used for the sake of consistency with the
theoretical model, while the monetary base is necessary to complete the speciﬁcation
of the government budget constraint. Finally, the surplus components are adjusted
to better match the conceptual model described above. In particular, adjustments
are made to convert corporate income taxes from accrual to cash basis, to include
spending and revenue from U.S. territories and Puerto Rico and to include contri-
butions to Federal employee retirement funds. The quantitative importance of these
adjustments is small.7
To obtain a Federal debt series which obeys a ﬂow budget constraint, we accumulate
debt with the NIPA-deﬁned Federal net borrowing ﬁgure using the equation Vt −
Vt−1 = Net Borrowing − Seignorage, where V it total nominal debt outstanding.
6Ideally, ﬁscal variables would include Federal and state and local variables, as is typical in this
literature. But state and local governments generally have balanced-budget rules, while debt ﬁnanc-
ing is permitted only for certain capital expenditures. This suggests that ﬁscal-ﬁnancing decisions
are likely to diﬀer substantially across Federal and state and local governments, so separating the
two levels of government is reasonable.
7These adjustments are derived from NIPA table 3.18B. The data in this table are not seasonally
adjusted, unlike the data series that we employ elsewhere. We have used these corrections without
seasonal adjustment largely because they slightly improve the ﬁt between our generated series and
the Dallas Fed’s data set, as discussed in footnote 8.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 13
We validate this series by comparing it the market value data produced by Cox and
Hirschhorn (1983).8
The VAR features ﬁve lags of each endogenous variable and a constant, in or-
der to maintain, as much as possible, the framework of Perotti (2004), which serves
as our point of comparison to the existing literature. Relative to other VARs es-
timated in the literature [for example, Perotti (2004)], this system is on the large
side. However, as has been recognized in other contexts [see Favero and Giavazzi
(2007)], the estimated dynamics of a VAR system including debt and investment can
diﬀer consequentially from estimates derived from a model not including these vari-
ables. Moreover, a sizable literature, including Hansen and Sargent (1991), Lippi and
Reichlin (1994), Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson (2007),
demonstrates that studying present-value restrictions such as (26) and (27) in VAR
systems which are “too small” can lead to severe diﬃculties due to non-invertibility.
9
When all components of the linearized budget identity, (20), are included in the infor-
mation set, however, our previous derivation of the present-value restrictions shows
that equations (26) and (27) must be satisﬁed, even with an information set coarser
than that used by private agents. We are thus entitled to impose these restrictions
directly on our baseline VAR.
We examine informally the impact of enlarging the information set in ﬁgure 3,
which presents multipliers from three models. The smallest model is a six variable
VAR typical of the literature, except for the separate inclusion of transfers, and
includes Federal taxes, transfers and spending as well as the 3-month T-bill rate,
the GDP deﬂator and output. The second model then adds investment and the
Federal debt stock to the information set, while the third model is our baseline ten-
variable VAR. Over the short-run, point estimates of impulse responses from the
six variable model are qualitatively quite similar to those obtained from the larger
models, although appreciable quantitative diﬀerences for output and price responses
do emerge between 10 and 20 quarters after the shock. In particular, the fall in
prices following a spending shock is around twice as large in the baseline as compared
to the smallest model, while, in the smallest model, the fall in prices following a
tax shock is considerably below the baseline (indeed, outside the lower 90 percent
conﬁdence interval by the end of the ﬁrst decade). Much of the diﬀerence between
8 The Cox and Hirschhorn data are available at http://www.dallasfed.org/data/data/natdebt.htm.
They construct a market value of debt series by computing Vt ≡
PJ
j=1 Bt(j)Qt(j) for maturities
j = 1,2,...,J. Because our empirical model includes NIPA-based measures of receipts and
expenditures, the Cox-Hirschhorn debt series will not generally be consistent with net borrowing as
deﬁned by NIPA.
9That is, small VARs can imply that the econometrician’s information set is strictly smaller than
economic agents’, making it impossible to recover the exogenous ﬁscal shocks—t(T),t(G), and
t(Z)—from current and past data—ft−j,j ≥ 0. Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009) describe this
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the smallest model and the baseline appears to arise from the inclusion of investment
and debt, insofar as the inclusion of these two variables alone eliminates any important
quantitative diﬀerence relative to the baseline.
5. Baseline Estimates
5.1. Baseline Multipliers. Figures 4 and 5 report multipliers for both the con-
strained and unconstrained VAR following ﬁscal policy shocks which lead to a one-
percent of trend GDP innovation in the corresponding policy instrument.
10 Conﬁ-
dence intervals are computed from 5000 Monte-Carlo draws using the unconstrained
baseline VAR as the data-generating process and assuming normal innovations.
The baseline VAR reproduces many of the standard ﬁndings in the literature. Upon
a surprise tax increase, output falls, while a spending increase generates a rise in
output. Also consistent with the literature, spending shocks generate short-lived
crowding out of investment and a prolonged period of lower prices. For each shock,
the initial impact on the primary surplus is rapidly reversed within two to three years
of the shock. However, due to the presence of highly persistent transients, the surplus
then oscillates around zero for a prolonged period (on the order of 50 years) before
beginning to convergence more or less monotonically. Once convergence sets in, the
surplus supports the initial debt innovation for each type of shock.
Broadly speaking, imposing the present-value leaves the impulse responses quan-
titatively unperturbed. Perhaps surprisingly, the most dramatic eﬀect is on output.
After about 10 years, the output response leaves the 68 percent conﬁdence interval for
every ﬁscal policy shock. In the most extreme cases, for tax and spending shocks, the
diﬀerence in output is around half a percentage point, relative to the unconstrained
estimates. As ﬁgure 5 reports, imposing present-value balance also has relatively large
eﬀects on point estimates for the trajectory of debt, although, in this case, the eﬀect
is to restrain the absolute value of deviations from baseline. Ultimately, however, the
impulse responses of the two models do not appear sharply distinguishable, given the
(im)precision of the baseline point estimates.
6. How Debt-Financed Fiscal Shocks Have Been Financed
At this point, we turn to the forward-looking aspect of government ﬁnance. In
particular, we wish to ascertain what combination of adjustments in the expected
10Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the multipliers for quantity variables are calculated
by multiplying the impulse response functions for the log variable by the share of that variable in
output. The interpretation is that the multiplier gives the change in the trajectory for that variable,
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path of ﬁscal policy instruments and discount rates rationalizes the decision of private
agents to hold government debt at prevailing market prices. In addition, we would
like to learn something about the dynamics of adjustment. This section addresses the
following questions: How does adjustment depend on the nature of the ﬁscal policy
shock? Over what horizon must one forecast in order to see present-value balance?
Are there important diﬀerences in the way that transient and persistent movements
in debt are ﬁnanced?
6.1. Fiscal Finance: Present Values. The basic present-value decomposition pre-
viously described is displayed in table 4. Consistent with the convention for impulse
response functions, the table shows present-value components following one-percent
of trend GDP responses from the policy instruments associated with each type of
shock. The components are scaled so that they add to the initial debt innovation,
shown in the ﬁrst row. Present-value components help to stabilize debt when the sign
of their contribution in the table is the same as the sign of the initial change in debt.
From the table, one sees immediately that, in the baseline VAR, the diﬀerent ﬁscal
policy shocks are ﬁnanced very diﬀerently in present-value terms. For tax shocks,
both the discount rate and the present-value of surpluses at constant rates move to
support debt, with the lion’s share of the work done by changes in the present-value
of surpluses. This is, presumably, the intuitive picture of how debt is ﬁnanced in
present-value. By contrast, the role of the discount rate is much less intuitive for
spending and transfer shocks. In the case of surprise spending increases, in fact,
while taxes do rise sharply and persistently, their contribution is swamped by the
combination of higher spending and transfers. The present-value of surpluses at
constant discount rates actually falls. Present-value balance is maintained only by
drastic and prolonged fall in real interest rates, the bulk of which is accounted for
a fall in the nominal interest rate. The story is reversed for surprise increases in
transfers. The initial transfer increase is quite transient and, in the longer horizon,
lower expected transfers account for most of the present-value of surpluses, with taxes
and spending oﬀsetting each other. The discount rate resists present-value balance,
again largely due to changes in the path of nominal interest rates, in this case a sharp
rise.
For each type of ﬁscal policy shock, taxes and transfers experience sizeable but
oﬀsetting movements in present value, as was apparent from the impulse response
functions. Moreover, except in the case of transfers, the present value of taxes moves
to support the innovation in debt, while the present-value of transfers moves against
it. In the case of transfers, it is spending and taxes which move in oﬀsetting fashion,
while transfers bears the burden of adjustment.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 16
The table presents 68 percent conﬁdence intervals for each present-value compo-
nent. However, for the purposes of assessing the role in stabilization of a given
component, it is perhaps also informative to report the fraction of draws in which
each component moves in the same direction as the initial debt innovation, that is,
the probability that the component is supports the change in debt. Taxes support the
change in debt in over 90 percent of draws for both tax and spending shocks. On the
other side, the present-value of spending moves with the change in debt in 13 percent
and 8 percent of cases, following those shocks. Transfers support debt in less than
10 percent of draws for either shock. Relative imprecision of the spending response
estimate prevents sharp characterization of the role of the primary surplus, but net
taxes (taxes less transfers) do support debt in over 90 percent of draws, both for tax
and for spending shocks. Regarding the role of the real interest rate trajectory, less
can be said with any conﬁdence, but the real rate is stabilizing, following a spending
shock, in 86 percent of draws.
6.2. Fiscal Finance: Dynamics. The summary accounting in the previous sec-
tion, while informative, does not reveal much of the dynamic structure that supports
present-value balance. In this section, we aim to illuminate this topic by examining
the horizon over which present-value balance is attained. The funding horizon, which
is computed using the analog of 12 for the estimated VAR, addresses the issue of how
far into the future one must forecast in order to see present-value balance. For some
classes of shocks, the answer is “quite a long time.”
Truncated present-values for each type of ﬁscal policy shock are illustrated by ﬁgure
6, where the solid lines represent truncated present-values of discounted surpluses, up
to the date indicated. Each series is scaled by the initial debt innovation, so that
asymptotically, each must converge to minus one for a tax cut that lowers debt by
one unit and plus one for a spending or transfers increase that raises debt by one
unit. The estimated truncated present-value series undergo dramatic ﬂuctuations
during the ﬁrst half-century following the shock. Ultimately, for instance, following a
tax shock, roughly sixty years is required before the truncated series is permanently
within ten percent of its long-run value, while, following a transfer shock, more than
a century is needed. In the intervening period, the truncated present-values exhibit
wide and persistent deviations from long-run balance.
7. Robustness to Alternative Modeling of the Long-Run
Estimates of long-run funding components are inherently sensitive to the long-run
properties of the estimated VAR. In this section, we examine the extent to which our
baseline results are aﬀected by the imposition of restrictions reﬂecting prior beliefs
about the non-stationary components of the system. In particular, we re-estimateWHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 17
the VAR system subject to the intertemporal government budget constraint as well
as additional restrictions enforcing the presence of unit-root modes in the dynamics.
See appendix B for the derivation of the resulting estimator.
Johansen (1988, 1991) tests on the unconstrained VAR suggest a two to three di-
mensional unit-root block. Accordingly, ﬁgures 7 and 8 display the impact of impos-
ing a two-dimensional unit-root block on both the unconstrained and the constrained
model. Imposing unit-root behavior has little eﬀect on the short-run dynamics (within
the ﬁrst decade, say) of any variable except the short nominal rate. However, over
longer horizons, important diﬀerences do manifest, most consequentially, in the real
interest rate, which displays notably less stabilizing behavior in the non-stationary
model. Following a spending shock, the real interest rate is permanently higher and,
indeed, is above its initial level forever, after 20 years. Consequently, as table 5
shows, the contribution of changes in the real interest rate trajectory moves against
the initial debt innovation for all ﬁscal shocks.
Moreover, for this model, the primary surplus is stabilizing for each shock and the
contribution of the seigniorage term is now no longer negligible. The sharper results
for the primary surplus arise from the more consistent behavior of this series following
each shock. In the case of tax shocks, the eﬀect of the shock on the primary surplus is
reversed within 2-3 years, just as in the baseline model. However, this reversal is now
persistent. A surprise tax increase raises the primary surplus almost one-for-one on
impact, but, by the end of the second year, the primary surplus has fallen into deﬁcit,
where it remains, with a few very brief, slightly positive periods, forever. A similar
trajectory for the primary surplus is evoked by transfer shocks, where the initial fall
in the surplus is reversed permanently at the end of the third year.
The pattern of behavior across primary surplus components is similarly more con-
sistent across the shocks than in the baseline. In the Monte Carlo simulation, net
taxes are stabilizing in 95 percent of draws following a tax shock, 92 percent of draws
following a spending shock and 82 percent of draws following a transfer shock. By
contrast, spending is stabilizing only in 13 percent of draws following a tax shock and
6 percent of draws following a spending shock. The additional stabilization provided
by taxes results from permanent level changes, while much of the change in the con-
tribution from transfers is accounted for by diﬀerent short- to medium-run behavior
during the few decades after the shock.
8. Conclusion
Although the previous section suggests that our present-value decompositions dis-
play considerable sensitivity to the modeling of long-run dynamics, we can never-
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shocks, we ﬁnd strong and robust evidence that the tax response is stabilizing, as is
the response of net taxes. By contrast, in response to either tax or spending shocks,
the change in the spending trajectory does not appear to support the initial debt
innovation.
Decisions about the modeling of long-run dynamics appear most important for
estimates of the role of the real interest rate. In the baseline, there is some evidence
that the real interest rate is stabilizing for tax and spending shocks, particularly
in the later case. However, when unit restrictions are imposed, this conclusion is
reversed, with the preponderance of evidence, if anything, showing that the real
interest rate response fails to support debt. Consequently, the imposition of unit-root
restrictions appears to attenuate rather substantially the considerable diﬀerences in
the intertemporal ﬁnancing mechanisms for tax and spending shocks evident in the
baseline. Regardless of the long-run modeling framework, however, present-value
balance is only achieved over a long forecast horizon, on the order of 50 to 100 years,
depending on the shock, and subject to wide swings away from present-value balance
before settling in to convergence.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 19
Appendix A. Deriving the Restrictions Implied by the Government’s
Present-Value Constraint
Recall that to ﬁrst order, the present-value constraint, expression (22), is












and also that the variables in this equation are assumed to be spanned by factors ft
which evolve as
ft = B0 +
L X
l=1
ft−lBl + ut (33)
Then one has that


























































































Therefore, the present-value constraint can be written






































Assuming that ft has a full rank covariance matrix, this equation implies restrictions
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and



















For estimation purposes, it is convenient to rewrite the ﬁrst of these restrictions as a
linear restriction on B. To this end, multiply equation (37) by I − βB to obtain













which is equation (26) in the text.
Accounting for seigniorage modiﬁes the present-value constraint (17) such that the
value of liabilities outstanding (debt plus the monetary base) is equated to the present
value of the primary surplus plus seigniorage (formally mt−1(Rt−1 − 1)/πt). Upon
linearization of this augmented present-value relation, a suitable VAR constraint can
then be derived exactly parallel to the line of reasoning above.
Appendix B. Imposing the Government Budget Constraint with Unit
Root Dynamics
This appendix describes how to estimate VAR models subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint in presence of unit-root dynamics. Speciﬁcally, as before, suppose
that the underlying factor dynamics is
ft = B0 +
L X
l=1
ft−lBl + ut (40)
and that this VAR system is subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, given in
equation (29),
BC = C0 (41)
where B is composed of the stacked coeﬃcient matrices Bl, i.e., B ≡ [B1;...;BL].
As it happens, the restriction on the constant term, equation (30), can be written in
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A useful feature of this constraint is that the matrix multiplying B0 is the same matrix
which appears in the constraint for B.
Assume that the dynamics for ft are non-stationary, in the sense that there is a
k-dimensional subspace spanned by vectors υ such that
PL
j=l Blυ = υ. We wish
to estimate (40) subject to this unit-root requirement, as well as the intertemporal
constraints (41) and (43). Let the matrix Y denote the data matrix for the ft, and
let X be the data matrix containing a constant (in ﬁrst position) and the stacked
lags of ft. Further, using ; to denote vertical concatenation, let B ≡ [B0;B] and let
G0 ≡ [−k
1−β
β ;C0]. Then, suppose that we choose ˆ B, ˆ B0 and span(υ) to minimize
Trace

(Y − X ˆ B)




ˆ BC = G0 (45)
and
W
0 ˆ Bυ = υ (46)
where W 0 is a known matrix which maps B into
P
l Bl. Concretely, the matrix W
is an NL + 1 by N matrix, whose ﬁrst row is zero, followed by L copies of the
N-dimensional identity matrix.
The resulting estimator is most easily motivated by considering ﬁrst the problem
subject only to equation (46). The resulting ﬁrst-order necessary conditions are
X




0B − 1N) = 0 (48)
where µ is the matrix of Lagrange multipliers on equation (46). Imposing the con-
straint to eliminate µ from equation (47), one ﬁnds that ˆ B is given by





















Accordingly, equation (48) can be written
PυΓ0 (1N − Pυ) (51)
where
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Equation (51) implies that Γ0 leaves the kernel of Pυ invariant, which, in turn, implies
that some subset of eigenvalues of Γ0 is a basis for the span of υ. To settle which
subset, we re-write the ˆ B-dependent part of the criterion function (44) as
Trace






ˆ B − BOLS

(53)
which is equivalent to minimizing
Trace(PυΓ0Pυ) (54)
Given that, without loss of generality, υ is a matrix of eigenvectors of Γ0, the solution
of the minimization problem amounts to selecting υ to be the k eigenvectors of Γ0
whose eigenvalues have the least magnitude.
When the intertemporal budget constraint is imposed, the strategy is similar. In
this case, if λ is a matrix of Lagrange multipliers on equation (45), the ﬁrst-order
necessary conditions are
X
0(Y − X ˆ B) + Wµυ
0 + λC
0 = 0 (55)
µ
0 (W
0B − 1N) = 0 (56)
Again, imposing the constraints and eliminating the Lagrange multipliers from (55),
we can solve for ˆ B explicitly:











where BR is the least-squares estimator subject to the budget constraint





J ≡ υ (υ
0 (1N − PR)υ)
−1 υ
0 (1N − PR) (59)
Accordingly, equation (56) can be written
J
0Γ(1N − J) (60)
where










The matrix J satisﬁes
Jυ = υ (62)
so, taking the transpose, equation (60) holds if and only if
J
0Γυ = Γυ (63)
The structure of J0 implies then that Γυ lies in the span of (1N − PR)υ, i.e., there
is a matrix H such that ΓυH = Γυ. Moreover, H must be invertible, for, if not,WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 23
there would be a matrix H⊥ such that 0 = Γ−1 (1N − PR)υHH⊥ = υH⊥, which is
impossible if υ is a set of linear independent vectors.
Suppose then that H−1 exists and has Jordan decomposition UHΛHU
−1





−1 (1N − PR)υUH (64)
Without loss of generality, therefore, υ can be chosen as a k-dimensional set of the
eigenvectors of Γ−1 (1N − PR), such that the corresponding eigenvalue is non-zero. As
in the unconstrained case, the choice of eigenspace minimizes the criterion function
(44).





































The structure of J, with the projector (1N − PR) on the right, implies that cross-
terms in this quadratic are zero. Hence, the υ-dependent part of the criterion func-
tion reduces to Trace(JJ0Γ), or Trace
 
(υ0 (1N − PR)υ)
−1 υ0Γυ

. Using the fact
that υΛ
−1
H = Γ−1 (1N − PR)υ, conclude that υ0Γυ = υ0Γ
 





mately, the criterion function is minimized by minimizing Trace(ΛH), and therefore
by choosing υ to be the k eigenvectors of Γ−1 (1N − PR) with the lowest non-zero
eigenvalues.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 24
Parameters
β γ γN θ A α δ
.99 1 1 3.48 1 2/3 .025
Policy Rule Output Elasticities
ϕG ϕτ ϕZ
0 1.5065 −.15
Steady State Policy Variables
G/Y T/Y Z/Y B/Y
.0839 .1171 .0882 .495
Table 1. Parameter settings in the real business cycle model. Steady
state policy variables calibrated to match U.S. data used to estimated
identiﬁed VARs. Policy shocks have ﬁrst-order serial correlation pa-
rameter of .80. Policy rule output elasticities calibrated from Perotti
(2004) and steady state policy variables.
Financed by (Present Value)
Shock to T G Z R S
G −.03 −4.03 5.14 −.08 1.08
T −3.24 0 4.25 −.004 1.004
Z 0 0 1 0 1
Table 2. Real business cycle model. The fraction of positive gov-
ernment debt innovations, due to shocks listed in the ﬁrst column,
that are ﬁnanced by each of the components of the government bud-
get. Simulation assumes that transfers clear the government budget:
γZ = 1,γG = γτ = 0. R denotes the stochastic discount factor; S
denotes net surplus, derived by summing columns labeled T, G, and Z.
Y π
Tax Elasticity 3.15 1.64
Spending Elasticity 0 −.5
Transfer Elasticity −.15 −1
Table 3. Calibrated elasticities in identiﬁed VAR with taxes and
transfers separated.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 25











































Table 4. Present-value funding components from a constrained VAR,
along with 68 percent conﬁdence intervals, in units of goods. The conﬁ-
dence intervals are obtained from 5000 draws of a Monte Carlo simula-
tion, using the unrestricted VAR point estimates as a data-generating
process and with the median centered at the 2-dimensional unit root
VAR point estimates.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 26











































Table 5. Present-value funding components from a constrained VAR
with 2-dimensional unit root block, along with 68 percent conﬁdence
intervals, in goods units. The conﬁdence intervals are obtained from
5000 draws of a Monte-Carlo simulation, using the unconstrained 2-
dimensional unit root VAR as the data-generating process and with
the median centered at the 2-dimensional unit root VAR point esti-
mates.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 27









































































Figure 1. Responses to ﬁscal shocks when taxes clear the budget in
calibrated RBC model: γτ = 1,γZ = γG = 0. Solid line: transfers
adjust; dashed line: taxes adjust; dotted line: spending adjusts. Time
units in quarters.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 28















Figure 2. Government debt funding horizons for ﬁscal shocks when
taxes clear the budget in calibrated RBC model. Solid line: tax shock;
dotted-dashed line: spending shock; dotted line: transfers shock. γτ =
1 is rapid adjustment of taxes; γτ = .08 is slow adjustment of taxes.
Time units in quarters.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 29
































































































































































P2004 (T/Z + I + Debt)
Full VAR
Figure 3. Multipliers from VARs with various information sets.
P2004 (T/Z), dotted-dashed lines, is close to the speciﬁcation in Per-
otti (2004) and includes Federal taxes, spending, transfers, 3-month
T-bill rate, GDP deﬂator, and GDP; P2004 (T/Z+I+Debt), dashed
lines, adds investment and Federal government debt; Full VAR is the
baseline ten-variable system, solid lines with 68 percent and 90 percent
conﬁdence intervals, adds 10-year Treasury bond rate and monetary
base. Time units in quarters.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 30

































































































































































Figure 4. Eﬀects of imposing the government budget constraint on
baseline VAR. VAR, solid lines with 68 percent and 90 percent con-
ﬁdence intervals, is the unconstrained baseline ten-variable system;
VAR GBC, dashed-dotted lines, imposes the government’s intertem-





















































































































































































Figure 5. Eﬀects of imposing the government budget constraint on
baseline VAR. Components of the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint. VAR, solid lines with 68 percent and 90 percent conﬁdence
intervals, is the unconstrained baseline ten-variable system; VAR GBC,
dashed-dotted lines, imposes the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint. Time units in quarters.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 32











































Figure 6. Eﬀects of truncating the forecasting horizon on present-
value calculation. Uses the analog of expression (12), as applied to the
estimated baseline ten-variable VAR, solid lines; 2-dimensional unit
root VAR, dashed lines, with the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint imposed. Time units in quarters.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 33
































































































































































Figure 7. Eﬀects of imposing the government budget constraint. Un-
constrained 2-dimensional unit root VAR, dark solid lines and dashed
68 percent and 90 percent conﬁdence intervals; 2-dimensional unit
root VAR with government’s intertemporal budget constraint imposed,
light solid lines; unconstrained baseline ten-variable VAR, dark dotted-
dashed lines; and baseline ten-variable VAR with government’s in-
tertemporal budget constraint imposed, light dashed lines. Time units
in quarters.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 34



















































































































































































Figure 8. Eﬀects of imposing the government budget constraint.
Components of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Un-
constrained 2-dimensional unit root VAR, dark solid lines and dashed
68 percent and 90 percent conﬁdence intervals; 2-dimensional unit root
VAR with government’s intertemporal budget constraint imposed, light
dashed lines; baseline ten-variable VAR with government’s intertempo-
ral budget constraint imposed, light dotted-dashed lines. Time units in
quarters.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 35
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